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SITUATION III

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL STRIFE-PROTECTION OF SHIPS OF THIRD STATES
There is in state Ban armed atten1pt of party C,
the Commoners, to obtain control of the established
government of state B and the Commoners have obtained military control of one-half of state B and
the ports in that area. Armed vessels of state B
and of the Commoners are cruising off the coast.
Vessels of war of other states are also cruising off
the coast u11der instructions to maintain the rights
of their nationals. Such provisions as those
of the Non-Intervention Scheme of Observation,
March 8, 1937, bind states D, E, F, and G. Such
provisions as those of the Joint Resolution of the
United States, May 1, 1937, bind states F, G, H,
and I,_and states D, E, H, and I were bound by the
Nyon Agreement of September 14, J937. All states
were parties to the submarine warfare rules of
1930.
(a) The Feran, a merchant vessel, lawfully flying the flag of state F,"bound for port R, which is
under the control of state B, with a cargo of unassembled aircraft parts, is met 10 Iniles off the coast
by the Cape, a cruiser flying the flag of the Commoners. The Cape sends a small boat with three
1nen toward the Feran after it had sun1moned the
Fe~ran to come to and to submit to capture on the
ground that this action is in accord with the Joint
Resolution of May 1,1937. The Fera1t asks by radio
167533-40--7
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for instructions or aid from the Fona, a nearby
cruiser of state F. 1. What are the legal rights~
2. Would the rights be the same if the summons had
been by a cruiser of state B ~
(b) The Iris, a 111erchant vessel lawfully flying
the flag of state I, with a cargo of barbed wire, is
met by a submarine which does 11ot disclose its
identity,. but orders the crew to take to the boats
and row to fishing vessels which are in the vicinity
as the Iris will be sunk after ten mil1utes. The Iris
asks by radio for instructions or aid fro1n the I ona.,
a nearby cruiser of state I. 1. What are the legal
rights~ 2. Would the rights be the same if the
submarine had been under the flag of the Commoners~ 3. Would the rights be the same if the
submarine had been under the flag of state D ~
(c) The Gyra, an oil tanker lawfully flyi11g the
flag of state G, armed "for the preservation of discipli11e," is met 10 miles off the coast by the Ba1~n,
a cruiser of state B. The Bai1L summons the Gyra
to come to for visit and search and as the small boat
fron1 the Bai1L comes alongside, the crew of the
Gyra drive it off with the ar111s on board. The
Bain then signals that it is about to sink the Gy1·a.
The Gyra asks by radio for instructions or aid from
the Geno, a nearby cruiser of state G. 1. What are
the legal rights~ 2. Would the rights be the same
if the SU1n1nons was bv a cruiser of the Commoners~
In each of the above cases should a nearby cruiser
of state H take any action if specially requested b)r
the merchant vessels~
oJ

SOLUTION

(a) The Fo1La should notify the Feran that it is
coming to its aid to protect it against an illegal act.
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The Fo1~a also should notify the Cape that the lat-'
ter bas no right to interfere 'vith the Feran and
should tl1reaten the llse of force against the Ca1Je
if it refuses to desist. The rights 'YOllld be the same
if the sum1nons bad bee11 by a cruiser of state B.
(b) The I o1~a should notify the !Tis to try to
escape and should notify the Stlbmarine that it bas
110 rights in this situation and that force will be
used against it for the protection of the Iris. If
the Io1~a arrives before the It·1·s is actt1ally attacked
it should drive off the submari11e by force, a11d if
it reaches the place of attack too late to save the
lr1~s, it should cotlnter-attack the Stlbmarine. The
rights 'Nould be the same if the sub1narine had
been under the flag of the Commoners or that of
state D.
(c) The Geno should notify the Gyra to cease its
resistance and should notify the Bai1~ that the latter has no right either to visit and search or· to sink
the Gyra and shot1ld threaten force to compel it to
desist. The rights 'vould be same if the summons
was by a cruiser of the eonnnoners.
The cruiser of state H should take 110 actio11 in
the case of the Feran. In the case of the Iris it
may intervene and may counter-attack and destroy
the submarine. In the case of the Gyra, if it 'vit11esses the attack, it may intervene to protect the
Gyra but has no authority to counter-attack or
destroy the Bain.
The Spant.sh Civil Strije-Ge1~eral.-The situatioll in state B 'vhere the Commoners are ellgaged in an attempt to obtain control of the
established government is obviously very similar to
the legal state of affairs prevailing in Spain from
Jt1ly 1936 to 1939. The regular rules of belliger-
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ency do not apply, for no war exists in the legal
sense. Technically it is a condition of insurgency
only. Third states are 110t subject to the obligations of neutrality under general internatio11allaw
and the t'vo contestants do not possess belligerent
rights. In both the Spa11ish caf?e a11d in this
Situation III, however, outside po\vers have
adopted special n1easures which have no precedent
in international law. The effect of these acts is to
put the two parties upon the same basis, treating
them both alike. In operation, therefore, these
special provisions, in principle, are akin to neutrality. The result has been highly anomalous, for
third states have assumed an attitude of impartiality and have taken upon themselves certain
obligations when there \vas really no war, no call
for neutrality, and when under . normal circumstances fhe established, recognized government
would be ~ntitled to friendly support as prescribed
by the laws of peace.. Solution to the problems
must be sought upon the basis of the usual rules
of insurgency and the particular conventions and
regulations adopted for this conflict. The \vords
"civil strife" have been used advisedly_since "civil
\var" would imply the existence of a state of
belligerency, a legal condition recognized neither in
Spain nor in state B.
Mariti11~e rules d~tri1~g ins~trge?~cy.-During ill~urgency neither the government nor the insurg~1t
·forces have the right to visit and search shi s of
third states or to make seizures on the custo]!ill!L_
grou11ds of contraband, blockade a11d' unneutral
service. Within territorial waters both parties
may prevent supplies from reaching their opponent. This righ! of barring access gives 110 au-
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thority to se!_zEL _QP destroy foreign ships. The
IDslirgent or government cruiser in such cases may
direct the ship to a certain port where the supplies
may be seized or may remove them from the ship
provided compensation is rendered.
This subject of the rights of the parties in insurgency has frequently been discussed in Naval
War College Situations, the most famous of these
being that of 1902 when the fllndamental principles
were laid down.
No right of confiscation or destruction of foreign property
in such circumstances (in territorial waters) could 'veil be
recognized and any act of injury so committed against foreigners would necessarily be at the risk of insurgents * * *
their only right being * * * to prevent the access of
supplies to their domestic enemy. The exercise of this power
is restricted to the precise end to be accomplished. (Naval
War C'ollege Situation, 1902, p. 80.)
Insurgents actually having before the port of the state
against which they are in insurrection, a force sufficient, if
belligerency had been recognized, to maintain an international
la'v blockade, may not be materially able to enforce the conditions of a true blockade upon foreign vessels upon the high
seas, even though they be approaching the port. Within the
territorial limits of the country, their right to prevent the
access of supplies to their enemy is practically the same on
'vater as on land-a defensive act in the line of hostility to
the enen1y. (Ibid, p. 82.)
So far as territorial "\"Vaters are concerned, both the de jure
and the de facto governments are entitled to take defensive
measures within the waters adjoining the coast which they
respectively occupy, but any such action is taken entirely
under the Inunicipal la'v and has nothing 'vhatever to do
"~ith belligerent rights.
(British Yearbook of International
Law·, 1937, p. 27.)
Positio1~

of third states during insurgency.-

When legally there is no war, third states are nq_t
neutral,_and the governments of third states are
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governed by the customary la,vs of peace in their
relation 'vitl1 the established gov~rnment. Foreig11
governments, therefore, may legally sell arms to_
the recognized gov~rnment but may not do so tQ_
the insurgents, for such an act would be ta11ta1nou-nt to i11tervention. The existence of ill_§Urgency rather than belligerency tends to be more
favorable to the constituted authorities than to_the
revoltitio11ists. This is logical enough consideri11g
the fact that peace still prevails. The Havana
Conventio11 of 1928 on Rights and Duties of States
i11 Civil Strife formally recognizes this favoring of
the regular government.
ARTICLE

1. 'I'he contracting states bind themselves

* * *

to forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when
intended for the government, while the belligerency of the
rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules
of neutrality shall be applied.
ARTICLE 3. The insurgent vessel, 'vhether a warship or a
merchantinan, equipped by the rebels, 'vhich arrives at a
foreign country or seeks refuge therein, shall be delivered by
the govern1nent of the latter to the constituted government
of the state in civil strife. (U. S. Treaty Series, No. 814.)

Unless there is a don1estic law to the co11trar).2
private persons may sell arms and supplies, at their
o'vn risk, to either side in cases of insurgency. The
obligations of neutrality con1e i11to the picture only
'vhen a state like the United States forbids the fitting out and armil1g of expeditio11s on beh~If of
either co11testant. (The Three Friends, 166 U. S.
1.) To this limited extent, where expeditions are •
involved, third states are really neutral.
I1~s~trgency a1td blockade.-It has long been clear
that neither the government nor the rebel forces
has the right to establish a blockade as long as there
is only insurgency. The parent government may
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declare certain ports closed but must enforce that
order by effectiv,e means within the three mile
limit. What may look, therefore, like a regular
blockade, is legally only an act of enforcement for
a domestic decree. The rights of third states upon
the high seas are unaffected. It has been held that
such closures n1ust be ''effective,'' the criterion of
a belligerent blockade thus appearing somewhat
paradoxically in what is technically a peacetime
situation. (See Oriental Navigation Co. Claim,
U. S.-Mexico General Claims Commission, 1928,
Opinions of Commissioners, 1929, p. 23.)
This rule that parent state orders of closure
must be enforced is a mid\vay measure bet\veen two
other possibilities. One of these would be that the
lJarent state could close a port by simple decree,
just as it could if there were no revolt, without any
requirement that the order be supported by effective force. Some who reject this proposition contend that if the pare11t govern1nent wishes to prevent access to ports held by revolutionists, it must
1·ecognize the belligerency of the opposition, that is,
the peculiar status of a blockade which is not a
blockade should be discarded. Practice ho\vever,
is still along the lines of "effective" closure without belligerency. (For a clear discussion of these
matters see I-I. Briggs, "The La\v of N atio11s," pp.
745-749.)
Blockade i1~ the Spanish c,ivil strife.-Early in
the conflict, the Spanish "Loyalist" government
declared that certai11 ports in the hands of the
rebels constituted a "war zone.'' In its reply to
this announcement the America11 government
stated that it could not admit the legality of such
action unless the Spanish government maintained
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an "effective" blockade. The legalline.s in this situation 'vere not clear. Was the Spanish Government issuing a closure order in the usual sense discussed above~ It declared a '',var zone~,, but the
United States replied in terms of a blockade. If
the government decree was a real blockade order,
then it should have been treated as a recognition of
belligerency as was Lincoln's blockade measure in
1861. (The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.) If it was
not a blockade order, the United States should have
answered in terms of the customary closure rules.
The normal legal distinctions were thus blurred, a
situation far from unusual in the whole story of
the Spanish strife.
'
Could General Franco, the insurgent, ''blockade''
Loyalist ports~ By their actions outsid·e powers
admitted that be could intercept and interfere with
the commerce of third states within the 3-mile
limit. This 'vas true both at Bilbao and at Barcelona, and his actions there were in conformity "\Vith
those usually allo,ved to insurgents, as described in
connection with the Naval War College Situation
of 1902 above.
On August 21 Mr. Eric C. Wendelin, in charge of the
American Embassy in ~1adrid, received a note verbale, dated
August 20, 1936, from the Spanish Foreign Office at Madrid
'vhich stated:
''Spanish ports in the power of the rebels as well as those
of Ceuta and Melilla and the ports of our proscription zone in
~forocco, Balearic and Canary Islands, have all been declared
a 'var zone and therefore it is not possible for the ships of our
fleet to permit the entry into them of merchant ships in order
in this way to prevent furnishing of provinces of Almeria,
Murcia, Alicante, and Badajoz and supplies to the rebels."
The Spanish Foreign Office requested that this information
be transmitted to the American Government in order that
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American merchant ships may be \Yarned and that thus "possible incidents may be avoided."
Mr. Wendelin reported that he believed that the same communication had been sent to all other governments.
The Secretary of State, on August 25, instructed Mr.
Wendelin to address the following note to the Minister of
State in reply to the Minister's note verbale of August 20:
"Sir:
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note
of August 20, 1936, requesting me to inform my Government, in order that American merchant ships might be
warned and possible incidents thus avoided, that your Government has declared Spanish ports in control of the insurgents, both on the Spanish mainland and in Morocco
and the Balearic and Canary Islands, a war zone into which
merchant vessels will not be permitted to enter.
"l\1y Government directs me to inform you in reply that,
with the friendliest feelings toward the Spanish Government, it cannot admit the legality of any action on the part
of the Spanish Government in declaring such ports closed
unless that Government declares and maintains an effective
blockade of such ports. In taking tllis position my Government is guided by a long line of precedents in international
law with which the Spanish Government is doubtless
familiar." (Press Releases, Vol. XV, No. 361.)
November 17, 1936, General Franco announced his intention. of stopping the traffic in arms and munitions to
Barcelona. His note to the Powers said :
"The scandalous traffic in arms, ammunition, tanks, airplanes, and even toxic gases, which is being carried on
through the port of Barcelona is well known. All this material is being transported to this port in ships flying different flags whose real nationality in its greater part is
Russian or Spanish.
"The National Government, being resolved to prevent this
traffic with every means of war at its disposal \vill even go
so far, if this were necessary, as to destroy that port.
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"Therefore, it 'varns all foreign ships anchored in that
harbor of the desirability of abandoning it in a very short
time to avoid the consequences of damage which, unintentionally, might be caused to them on the occasion of the
military action referred to of 'vhich no further warning
"~ill be given."
(London Times, Nov. 20, 1936.)
I1~s~trgent

vessels and pi'racy.-Despite the court
decisio11 in the famous case of the Ambrose Light
(25 F. 408) in the last century, insurgent craft
on the high seas or in territorial 'vaters are not
pirates.
The declaration of piracy against vessels which have risen
in arms, e1nanating fron1 a government, is not binding upon
the other states. (Habana Convention 1928, op. cit., Art. 2.)
An insurgent government is regarded as possessing sufficient responsibility to prevent its naval officers from being
pirates ''hen they conform to the laws of war, even though
their actions may be illegal hecause they are not properly
qualHied to exercise belligerent functions. (British Yearbook of International Law, 1938, pp. 203-204.)

illegal actions upon the high seas are therefore
not syno11ymous vvith piracy. A state or a revolutionary group can be :P.eld responsible for the
unlawful acts of its vessels, and though often the
epithet of piracy is hurled at some grossly unlawful act co1nmitted by a belligerent or an insurgent
at sea, the terminology is moral1-aather than legal.
Piracy in the legal sense is a special form of concurrent jurisdiction under which the 'varships of
all states on the higl1 seas have the at1thority to
seize pirate vessels, piracy consisting of an act of
violence for a private end outside the authority of
any political group or govern1nent.
Harvard draft code and piracy.-ARTICLE 3. Piracy is
any of the following acts, committed in a place not within
the territorial jurisdiction of any state.
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1. .i!ny act of violence or of depredation con11nitted with
intent to rob, rape, ''ound, enslave, ilnprison or kill a person
or 'vith intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends
'vithout bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right, proYided that the act is connected 'vith an attack on or from. the
sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an
attack 'vhich starts from on board ship, either that ship or
another ship which is involved must be a pirate ship or a ship
without national character.
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of
a ship with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship.
3. Any act of instigation or o:f intentional facilitation of an
act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article.
(A1nerican Journal of International Law, 1932, Supplement,
p. 743.)

The Nyo1~ an~ Geneva a1~~ra,nge11~e1~ts.-Because
of the many attacks upon. merchant shipping in
the Mediterranean by m1identified submarines dul'ing the course of the Spanish conflict in 1937, the
French and English governments took the initiative in formulating special arrangements for dealing "\vith this situation. At Nyon and at Geneva
agreements \Vere framed vvhich gave to the vvarships of the participating powers special rights not
accorded by customary international lavv. The
Nyon arrangement in its preamble stated that these
submarine attacks ''should be justly treated as acts
of piracy." This statement, hovvever, did not
legally confer the status of pi.racy upon submarines
making unlawflll attacks. "Illegal" not "piratical'' was the proper term to apply to the actions of
the undersea craft. These arrangements dealt
"\vith the n1ethod of coping vvith a particularly
ftagra11t violation of the rights of innocent ships.
It should be reme1nbered that even a visit and
search conducted in the lavvful manner \Vould have
been illegal since there "\Vas no belligerency. What
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these arrangements did \vas to confer upon the
\Varships of the participating states the right to
deal drastically \vith any interference which involved a violation of the legal rules in regard to
visit and search. Under the general law \Varships
of third powers may intervene to protect their own
vessels from any sort of molestation. By the Nyon
and Geneva arrangements any \varship could intervene to protect any non-Spanish ship and \vas
e11powered even to counter-attack and, if possible,
to destroy the submarine. This last grant of authority goes beyond the usual regulations which
pern1it a reasonable use of force to protect a vessel
but \vhich do not permit the use of force beyond
that required for saving the attacked vessel. These
arrangements \Vere designed to handle an illegality
\vithin an illegality, that is, they were framed with
the aim of preventing an illegal method of conducting \vhat was in any event an illegal operation.
Belligerent rights were not granted by these agreeInents which did ?Lot imply that lawful methods
\Vould legalize action inconsistent with a condition
of insurgency.
,.IHE

N YON

ARRANGEl\IENT, SEPTEl\IBER

14, 1937

\Vhereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have
been repeatedly conunitted in the Mediterranean by submarines against 1nerchant ships not belonging to either of
the conflicting Spanish parties; and
Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of internationalla'v referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London
of April 22, 1930 with regard to the sinking of merchant
ships and constitute acts contrary to the most elementary
dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as
acts of piracy; and
'\Vhereas "'~ithout in any ·way admitting the right of either
party to the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights
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or to interfere \Vith merchant ships on the high seas even
if the laws of warfare at sea are observed and without
prejudice to the right of any participating Po\ver to take
such action as may be proper to protect its merchant shipping from any kind of interference on the high seas or to
the possibility of further collective 1neasures being agreecl
upon subsequently, it is necessary in the first place to agree.
upon certain special collective measures against piratical
acts by submarines:
(a) Except as stated in (b) and (c) belo,v, no sub1narine
will be sent to sea within the Mediterranean.
(b) Submarines may proceed on passage after notification to the other participating Po,vers, provided that they
proceed on the surface and are acco1npanied by a surface
ship.
(c) Each participating Power reserves for purposes of
exercises certain areas defined in Annex I hereto in which
its submarines are exempt from the restrictions 1nentioned
in (a) or (b).
The participating Powers further undertake not to allow
the presence in their respective territorial waters of any
foreign submarines except in case of urgent distress, or
"·here the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) above
are fulfilled.
VI: The participating Po,vers also agree that, in order
to simplify the proble1n involved in carrying out the measures above described, they may severally advise their nlerchant shipping to follow certain main routes in the Mediterranean agreed upon between them and defined in Annex
II hereto.
'TII. Nothing in the present agreement restricts the right
of any participating Po\Yer to send its surface vessels to
any part of the Mediterranean.
VIII. Nothing in the present agreement in any \vay prejudices existing international engagements which have been
registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
IX. If any of the participating Po,vers notifies its intention of withdrawing fron1 the present arrangement, the notification will take effect after the expiry of thirty days and
any of the other participating Powers may withdraw on the
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satne date if it connnunicates its intent ion to this effect before that date.
Done at Nyon this fourteenth day of Septe1nber nineteen
hundred and thirty seYen, in a single copy, in the English
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic,
and "·hich ,,ill be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat
of the League of Nations.
GREECE
UNITED KINGDOn! OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND
N. ~fAYROUDIS
XORTHERX IREL...~ND
N. PoLITIS
S. PoLYCHRONIADis
ANTH01\""Y EDEN
BULGARIA

G. Ivossirv~-L."oFF
N. ~IO)ITCHILOFF

RUn!ANIA

'T

ICTOR ~£\.XTONESCO

TURKEY

EGYPT

DR. R. ARAs

W ACYF BouTRos-GHALI

UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

H.

AFIFI

FRANCE

Yvox DELBOS

nfAxnrn

Lrrv-IxoFF

YUGOSL.A. \TIA
BoJIDAR PoURITCH

In Yie'' thereof the undersigned, being authorized to this
effect by their respective Governtnents, have met in conference at Nyon between the 9th and the 14th Septe1nber
1937, and haYe agreed upon the following provisions which
shall enter inunediately into force:
I. The participating Powers "·ill instruct their naval
forces to take the action indicated in paragraphs II and III
below with a \iew to the protection of all merchant ships
n ot belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties.
II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship in a 1nanner
contrary to the rules of international law referred to in the
I nternational Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of
K a Yal Ar1naments signed in London on April 22, 1930, and
confir1ned in the Protocol signed in London on N ove1nber
6~ 1936, shall be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed.
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III. The instruction mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall extend to any sub1narine encountered in the
vicinity of a position where a ship not belonging to either
of the conflicting Spanish parties has recently been attacked
in violation of the rules referred to in the preceding paragraph in circumstances 'vhich give valid grounds for the
belief that the subn1arine was guilty of the attack.
IV. In order to facilitate the putting into force of the
above arrangements in a practical manner, the participating
Powers have agreed upon the following arrangements:
1. In the western Mediterranean and in the Malta Channel, with the exception of the Tyrrhenean Sea, which may
f_o rm the subject of special arrangements, the British and
French fleets 'vill operate both on the high seas and in the
territorial waters of the participating Powers, in accordance with the division of the area agreed upon bet,veen the
t"'"'o Governments.
2. In the eastern Mediterranean,
(a) Each of the participating Powers 'vill operate in its
own territorial waters;
(b) On the high seas, with the exception of the Adriatic
Sea, the British and French "fleets will operate up to the
entrance to the . Dardanelles, in those areas where there is
reason to apprehend danger to shipping in accordance with
the division of the area agreed upon between the t'vo Governments. The other participating Governments possessing
a sea border on the Mediterranean, undertake, within the
limit of their resources, to furnish these fleets any assistance
that n1ay be asked for; in_p~rticular2 they 'vilLper1nit the1n
take -action in their
territorial
to ....____
------- - waters and to use such of
their ports ~ they shall indicate.
3. It is further understood that the limits of the zones referred to in subparagraphs 1 and 2 above, and their allocation shall be subject at any time to revision by the participating Powers in order to take account of any change in
the situation.
V. The participating Powers agree that, in order to siinplify the operation of the above-mentioned n1easures, they
'vill for their part restrict the use of their submarines in
the ~1editerranean in the follo,ving manner :
(League of Nations Docu1nent, C.409.NI.273.1937.VII)
.
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AGREEl\IENT SUPPLEl\IENT.ARY TO THE NYON ARRANGEl\IENT,
GENEVA, SEPTEl\IBER 17, 1937
Whereas under the Arrange1nent signed at Nyon on the
14th September, 1937, whereby certain collective measures
were agreed upon relating to piratical acts by submarines
in the l\fediterranean, the participating Powers reserved the
possibility of taking further collective measures; and
"Vhereas it is now considered expedient that such measures should be taken against si1nilar acts by surface vessels
and aircraft ;
In vie'v thereof, the undersigned, being authorized to this
effect by their respective Governments, have met in conference at Geneva on the seventeenth day of September and
have agreed upon the following provisions 'vhich shall enter
imn1ediately into force:
I. The present Agreement is supplementary to the Nyon
.._~rrangement and shall be regarded as an integral part
thereof.
II. The present Agreement applies to any attack by a surface Yessel or an aircraft upon any n1erchant vessel in the
l\iediterranean not belonging to either of the conflicting
Spanish parties, when such attack is accompanied by a violation of the humanitarian principles embodied in the rules
of international law wit_h regard to warfare at sea, which
are referred to in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April
22nd, 1930, and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London
on November 6th, 1936.
III. Any surface war vessel, engaged in the protection of
merchant shipping in conformity 'vith the Nyon Arrangement, which witnesses an attack of the kind referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall :
(a) If the attack is co1nmitted by an aircraft, open fire on
the aircraft;
(b) If the attack is co1nmitted by a surface vessel, intervene to resist it within the limits of its powers, summoning
assistance if such is available and necessary.
In territorial '\Vaters each of the participating Po,vers concerned 'viii give instructions as to the action to be taken by
its o". n 'var vessels in the spirit of the present .A.greement.
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Done at Geneva this seventeenth day of September 1937,
in the English and French languages, both texts being
equally authentic, in a single :copy which will be deposited
in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
(League of Nations Document 0.409.M.273.1937.VII.)
The submarine rules.-Submarine warfare and piracy
were definitely linked together in the resolutions presented
by Mr. Root at the Conference on Limitation of Armaments
in Washington in 1922. As presented, Mr. Root's proposal
sought to prohibit all use of submarines against merchant
vessels and to attach the penalty of piracy to any such employment. As finally embodied in the unratified Treaty
Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in
Warfare, the destruction of merchantmen without prior
visit, search, and placement of the personnel in safety was
declared to be a violation of the laws of war subjecting
any person in the service of any Power who should violate
such a rule, whether or not such person is under orders of
a governmental superior, to trial and punishment as if for
an act of piracy. This conclusion was reached in spite of
the consensus that it was not competent for the five Powers
present at the Conference to establish new rules of internationallaw, including the branding of such action as piracy
jure gentium. The decision 'vas also taken in spite of the
:fact that only one delegate, Mr. Hanihara of Japan, raised
a question as to the exact meaning of "punishment as if for
an act of piracy," which was brusquely pushed aside by
Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root who made no adequate answer
and immediately cut off :further debate. "\Vhile the treaty
'vas not ratified, it may be pertinent to point to the carefully studied observation in the comment on the Draft Convention on Piracy of the Harvard Law School Research in
International Law that "properly speaking * * * piracy
is not a legal crime or offense under the law of nations."
Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 invited
states to accede to the proposition that according to international law submarines must confor1n to the rules of surface craft, and that, except in case of resistance to visit and
search, merchant vessels n1ust not be destroyed without first
167533-40--8
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placing the crew, passengers, and ship's papers in safety.
Non -conformity by submarines was !lot branded an act
of piracy, nor was any state authorized to bring to trial
or to inflict the punishment for piracy upon the officers or
cre'v of any sub1narine violating the rules. lVhile nine of
the states invited to the N yon Conference had agreed to
abide by the rules of this treaty, the Spanish Government
had not done so. (N.J. Padelford, "Foreign Shipping during the Spanish Civil "'\Var," American Journal of International law, 1938, pp. 274-275.)
LoNDON,

N OVEl\IBER 6, 1936

'Vhereas the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction
of Naval Armaments signed in London on the 22nd April,
1930, has not been ratified by all the signatories;
And whereas the said treaty will cease to be in force after
the 31st December, 1936, with the exception of Part IV
thereof, which sets forth rules as to the action of submarines
'vith regard to merchant ships a·s being established rules of
international law, and remains in force without limit of
time;
And where as the last paragraph of Article 22 in the said
Part IV states that the high contracting parties invite all
other Powers to express their assent to the said rules;
And whereas the Governments of the French Republic
and the l{ingdom of Italy have confirmed their acceptance
of the said rules resulting fron1 the signature of the said
treaty;
And whereas all the signatories of the said treaty desire
that as great a number of Powers as possible should accept
the rules contained in the said Part IV as established rules
of international law;
I'he undersigned, representatives of their respective governments, bearing in mind the said Article 22 of the treaty,
hereby request the Government of the United l{ingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland forthwith to communien te the said rules, as annexed hereto, to the governments
of all the Po,vers which are not signatories of the said
treaty~ with an invitation to accede thereto definitely and
'vi thout limit of time.

~

NON -INTERVENTION

107

RULES

(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, sublnarines must conform to the rules of international la\v to
\vhich surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal
to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to
visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers,
crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in
the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of
land, or the presence of another vessel \V hich is in a position
to take them on board.
Signed in London, the 6th day of November, nineteen
hundred and thirty-six. (British Treaty Series, No. 29,
1936.)

N o1~intervention and the Spanish civil strife.Soon after the outbreak of the fighting in Spain
in July 1936, the European powers instituted the
scheme of Non-Intervention. This was undertaken primarily for political reasons, the outside
states being_d~.sperately anxious to avoid involvement_in the struggle. The ideological division between the Fascist powers supporting General
Franco and those inclining to favor the established
Tepublica11 government made the crisis acllte. It
was feared that the rival groups outside might
come into direct collisio11 as a result of their efforts .
to STip}Tly'- th-ei"ll- Spailisn f aYOrites \vith the sinews
of w ar:--The Non-I11tervention schen1e took the_ __
form not of a comprehensive, binding international
treaty, but rather of a series of exchanges of notes
and of llnilateral don1estic acts whicl1 freqllently
varied with one another bllt were generally pat-
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terned alo11g the same lines. The 11ations participati11g in the arra11ge1nent undertook to foroiu the
§ale of arms and implemeilts of war to eitherside.
The Spanish rebels were thus placed llpon the same
level as the so-called Loyalists, eve11 though there
was no belligerency. The whole scheme was
unique, and there has been nothi11g like it in the
history of international law. li1 undertaking these
special obligations, the British and French Governments waived the right to assist the government
they recognized in Spain. They did so hoping
thereby to prevent Italy and Germany from giving
governmental aid to the rebels, a right \vhich those
two powers did not possess, at least not until they
recognized General Franco as the legitimate ruler
of Spain in N ove1nber 1936 after the Non-I11terventioi1 plan had supposedly come into operation.
To implement the Non-Interventio11 accord, a
special Scheme of Observation \vas adopted in May
1937. By its terms warships of Great Britai11,
France, Italy; and Germany, \vere to patrol Spanish marginal seas in a zone extending from the 3mile limit outward for 7 miles. In addition,
elaborate plans were made for observers to travel
on the ships of third states going to Spain, the idea
of all this being to check up on the sup~lies reaching Spain and to report any infractions of the OilIntervention accord to a central committee in Lolldon. This patrol by war vessels was not a blockade
in any sense of the word. The powers engaged
\vere not at \var with Spain and were not taki11g
reprisals. The patrol ships had 110 right of-visit
a11d search, a11d no right to interfere \vith the vessels of states 11ot parties to the Non-Intervention
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agreement. A right of approach belo11ged to the
patrol ships but they could not employ force to
ascertain the true character of a vessel under suspicion which flew the flag of a non-signatory power.
This situation presented delicate questions for
international law. It was unique and went into
·effect as a special scheme for a special state of
affairs. The terms of the observation plan "\Vill be
found in the appendix to this volume.
(The non-intervention scheme) owes its inception to M.
Blum of France and is founded upon an exchange of notes
bet,veen Britain and France, August 15th, 1936, these notes,
which 'vere substantially identical, contained reference to the
establishment of a common attitude toward the Spanish strife,
a preamble, and three declarations of policy. The preamble
recited that the governments, deploring the events in Spain,
l1ad decided to abstain r~gorously from all interference (de
toute ingerence), direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of
Spain, on the basis of the desire to avoid complications prejudicial to the good relations bet,veen their "Peoples." They
then "declared": (1) they would prohibit the direct or in- direct exportation or reexportation of all "arms, munitions
and materials of 'var as 'veil as all airplanes, mounted or
dismantled, and all ships of war" from their territory to
Spanish territories; (2) the prohibitions 'vould apply to contracts in the process of execution ; ( 3) the governments would
keep other governments participating in the mutual understanding ( cette entente) informed of the measures taken to
carry out the prohibitions. The application of the declaration 'vas made contingent upon the adherence of the other
government, plus the governments of Germany, Italy, the
Soviet Union, and Portugal.
Twenty-seven governments eventually made si1nilar declarations, in one form or another. However, the composition
and contents of the notes varied so much it can hardly be said
that all of the states declared their intention of doing identically the same things. Above all, it must be emphasized
that there was no one instrtunent which all signed or adhered
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to, in spite of constant e1nployn1ent of the tern1 "agreement."
The agree1nent 'vas 1nerely a concert of policy, and its fulfillInent depended entirely upon the initiative of each state.
Analysis of the notes reveals that 15 (aside fron1 those of
Britain and France) of the 27 repeated verbatin1 both the
prea1nbulatory reasons for 1naking the declaration and the
three basic declarations of policy. Between these states and
France and Great Britain then, there ".,.as a community of
policy on the steps to be taken and on the reasons for taking
then1.
The notes of six states repeated verbatim the three seriatin1
declarations but on1itted the preamble. By o1nitting the preamble these states left themselves free to engage in all forms
of interference or intervention not specifically set forth in
the first two declarations, while the seventeen others noted
above agreed to refrain from all interference, direct or indirect. Legally speaking, these six states restricted themselves
less than did the others, and they are hardly to be condemned
for allowing volunteers, officers, financial, and moral aid passing to Spain, public opinion and newspapers notwithstanding. (N.J. Padelford, "The International Non-Intervention
Agreement and the Spanish Civil War," American Journal
of International Law, Oct. 1937, pp. 579-580.)

The TJ1Lited States and Spa1~ish civil strife.-The
American Government, acting independently, enacted legislation in harmony \vith the provisions of
the European non-intervention sche1ne. On January 8, 1937 a special lavv of Congress made linlawful the export of arms, annnunition, or implements of war to Spain during the existence of the
state of civil strife. The so-called neutrality law
of :Thfa·y 1, 1937, included a provision deali11g vvith
civil strife and under that statutory author~zation
the President proclaimed again ail embargo on
armed shipments to Spain. The United States
thus dealt impartially with both sides, despite the
fact that \Ve were not really neutral, a status impossible without the existence of 'var.

111

Al\IERICAN LA \V

Special act of

Co1~gress

in

1~egard

to

Spai1,~.-

JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROHIBIT THE ExPORTATION OF ARl\IS,
Al\Il\IUNITION' AND ll\IPLEl\IENTS OF WAR FROl\I THE uNITED
STATES TO SPAIN, JANUARY

8, 1937

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of A~erica in Congress assembled, That
during the existence of the state of civil strife now obtaining in Spain it shall, from and after the approval of this
Resolution, be unla,vful to export arms, ammunition, or
i1nple1nents of war from any place in the United States, or
possessions of the United States, to Spain or to any other
foreign country for transshipment to Spain or for use of
either of the opposing forces in Spain. P. . rms, ammunition,
or implements of war, the exportation of which is prohibited by this Resolution, are those enumerated in the
President's Procla1nation No. 2163 of April 10, 1936.
· Licenses heretofore issued under existing law for the exportation of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to
Spain shall, as to all future exportations thereunder, ipso
facto be de.e1ned to be cancelled.
'Vhoever in violation of any of the provisions of this
Resolution shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to
be exported either directly or indirectly, arms, am1nunition,
or imple1nents of war from the United States or any of its
possessions, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
'Vhen in the judgment of the President the conditions
described in this Resolution have ceased to exist, he shall
proclaim such fact, and the provisions hereof shall thereupon cease to apply .
.A.pproved, January 8, 1937, at 12.30 p. n1. (Public Resolution, No. 1, 75th Cong.)

Sections of the Act of JJfay 1) 1937.SEc. 1. " (c) Whenever the President shall find that a
state of civil strife exists in a foreign state and that such
civil strife is of a n1agnitude or is being conducted under
such conditions that the export of arms, ammunition, or
in1plements of war from the United States to such foreign
state would threaten or endanger the peace of the United

112

--

CIVIL STRIFE

· States, the President shall proclain1 such fact, and it shall
thereafter be unlawful to export, or attempt to export, or
cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of
war from any place in the United States to such foreign
state, or to any neutral state for transshipment to, or for the
use of, such foreign state."
"SEc. 10. 'Vhenever the President shall have issued a
proclamation under the authority of section 1, it shall thereafter be unla ,vful, until such proclamation is revoked, for
any American vessel engaged in commerce with any belligerent state, or any state 'vherein civil strife exists, named in
such proclamation, to be armed or to carry any armament,
arms, ammunition, or implements of war, except small arms
and ammunition therefor which the President may deem
necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation
of discipline aboard such vessels." (Public Res. No. 27,
75th Cong., ch. 146, 1st sess.)

Proclamation in regard to ar1ns.Al\fERICAN VESSELS ENGAGED IN CO::\Il\fERCE 'VITH SPAIN

Section 10 of the joint resolution of Congress approved
~fay 1, 1937, amending the joint resolution approved August
31, 1935, provides as follows:
"SEc. 10. Whenever the President shall have issued a
proclamation under the authority of section 1, it shall thereafter be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for
any American vessel engaged in commerce with any belligerent state, or any state wherein civil strife exists, named in
such proclamation, to be armed or to carry any armament,
arms, ammunition, or implements of 'var, except small arms
and ammunition therefor which the President may deen1
necessary and shall publicly designate for the preservation
of discipline aboard such vessels."
Section 11 of the said joint resolution provides as follo,vs :
"SEc. 11. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with la 'v,
as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or
authority conferred on him by this Act through such officer
or officers, or agency or agencies, as he shall direct."
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The President's proclamation of May 1, 1937, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of the above-mentioned
joint resolution provides in part as follows:
"And I do hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the
power to exercise any po,ver or authority conferred on me by
the said joint resolution, as made effective by this my proclamation issued thereunder, and the power to promulgate
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with law as may
be necessary and proper to carry out any of its provisions."
In pursuance of those provisions of the law and of the
President's proclamation of May 1, 1937, which are quoted
above, the Secretary of State announces that American vessels engaged in commerce with Spain may carry such small
arms and ammunition as the masters of these vessels may
deem indispensable for the preservation of discipline aboard
the vessels. (Press Releases, Vol. 16, No. 396.)

Attacks on foreign ships d~tri1~g Spa1tish civil
strife.-During the Spanish conflict the ships of
third states were frequently molested both inside
and outside of territorial waters by surface vessels, aircraft and submarines of the i11surgent and
government forces. These attacks \Vere entirely
unlawful and in many cases foreign powers have
intervened both to protest sharply and to protect
their shipping. Follovving are some instances of
such unlawful attacks:
The Nantucket Ohief.-Mr. T. Monroe Fisher, American
vice consul at Palma de l\1allorca, reported to the Department through the consulate at Marseille that he was informed by local naval authorities of the seizure of the
Nantucket Ohief on January 18, 1938, by Nationalist naval
vessels. The ship is now under the control of a Nationalist
naval officer. The manifest indicates that the vessel has
a cargo of gasoline and kerosene shipped from a Russian
port and destined for Barcelona.
The crew numbers about 30, of whon1 about 27 are An1erican citizens, 1 a Finnish citizen, and 2 British subjects.
The American oil tanker 1.Vantucket 0 hie f was seized by
the naval forces of General Franco on the night of January
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17, 1938, in latitude 40°45' N., longitude 3°45' E., approximately 48 miles north of the Balearic Islands and 80 miles
southeast of the nearest point on the Spanish coast. At the
time of seizure the tanker 'vas carrying a cargo of petroleum
from the Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse to Barcelona,
under charter to the Spanish petroleum monopoly. The
vessel 'vas taken to Pabna de l\fallorca and the Captain,
l\fr. J. E. Le,vis, 'vas taken ashore and imprisoned on J anuary 26 on charges not kno,vn to the Department.
The L'Tantu.cket 0 h1~e f is a vessel of American registry,
and the captain and n1ost of the crew are of American
nationality.
The Nantucket Ohief is o'vned by the Nantucket Chief
Steamship Co., a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Delaware.
Representations were Ina de informally to General Franco
through the An1erican Ambassador to Spain, temporarily
stationed at St. Jean de Luz, France, with a view to the
in1n1ediate release of this A1nerican vessel, of the captain,
and of the crew.
The Department is now informed that the Nantucket
0 hie f has left Palma de l\iallorca :for a mainland port or
ports, and that after the discharge of its cargo the vessel
and crew will be set at liberty. The Department is :further
jn:forn1ed that Capt. J. E. Lewis, who is still in prison at
Palma, will be released within a :few days.
Consul T. l\fonroe Fisher at Palma has reported (Feb.
10, 1938) to the Department of State that Capt. J. E. Lewis
" .. as released and left Wednesday 1norning by plane :for
Cadiz en route to l\tla1aga to join the LVantucket Ohief. He
had been well treated 'vhpe in1prisoned. He had been
slightly ill 'vith influenza and ""as given proper medical
attention.
Consul Leo J. Callanan at 1\tlalaga reported this afternoon
that Captain Le,vis arrived at Malaga this morning and has
restunecl charge of theN antucket Ohief. The Department of
State has not yet received 'vord regarding the release of the
ship although yesterday it did have a message giving the
information that orders had been issued for the release of
the ship. (Press Releases, Vol. X\TIII, Nos. 436, 437.)
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The V. S. S. Kane.-The Secretary of State sent the following telegraphic instruction last night to the American
Embassy at Madrid :
"AuGUST 30, 1936.
"AMERIOAN EMBASSY,

"Madrid, Spain.
"The United States Destroyer Kane left Gibralter at 8:12
a. m. August 30, en route to Bilbao to assist in the 'vork
of evacuating A1nerican nationals. According to report
fro1n her Commanding Officer, at 4:10 p. m., August 30,
'vhile the vessel was at 36 degrees, 33 minutes north and
7 degrees, 35 minutes west (approximately 38 miles from the
Spanish coast) an unidentified tri-motored, low winged
monoplane flew over the Kane and dropped two bombs
which exploded near the vessel. The Kane was flying the
American flag at her foremast head and in addition had
an American ensign horizontal on top of the well deck
awning. When this attack was made, the Kane increased
her speed to maneuver away from the plane. At 4: 25 p. m.
the plane again flew over the Kane and dropped a third
bomb. At 4:26 p. m. the Kane's anti-aircraft gun fired
two rounds in the direction of the plane. At 4: 32 p. m. the
plane again fle,v over the Kane and dropped three more
bombs, making a total of six. The [{ ane's antiaircraft gun
fired nine rounds in the direction of the plane during its
approach and retreat.
The attitude of the American Govern1nent in respect to
the conflict in Spain is 'vell known. The American Government has stressed the complete impartiality of its attitude
and has publicly stated that, in conformity with its well
established policy of non-interference with internal affairs
in other countries, either in time of peace or in the event
of civil strife, it will, of course, scrupulously refrain from
any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish
situation.
"Since the Government forces in Spain have, in the friendliest spirit, made every possible effort to avoid injury to
American nationals and An1erican property, it can only
be assumed that the attack on the United States Destroyer
f{ane, if made by a Government plane, ''as due to her
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identity having been mistaken for a vessel of the opposing
forces. Because of the friendly attitude of the Spanish
Govern1nent toward the United States and the absence of
any motive whatsoever for an attack upon an American
vessel, it is not conceivable that a Govern1nent plane would
knowingly make such an attack. The Alnerican Government
feels confident that it is fully understood in every quarter
that the sole purpose of the presence of American naval
vessels about the shores of Spain is to afford facilities for
the removal of . A. 1nerican nationals from Spain.
"Since the plane making the attack was unidentified, the
President has directed that this incident be brought to the
attention of the Spanish Government through you and informally, 'vith no intention as to recognition, to the attention of General Franco through the American Consul at
Seville, with the request that both sides issue instructions
in the strongest ter1ns, as the American Government feels
confident they 'viii desire to do, to prevent another incident
of this character.
"Take up this matter inunediately with the Spanish Government in the sense of the foregoing, endeavor to obtain a
categorical statement as to whether the plane making this
attack was a Govern1nent plane, and urge and insist upon
definite assurance that appropriate instructions will immediately be issued to the Governn1ent armed forces. Telegraph immediately and fully results of your representations." (Press Releases, Vol. XV, No. 363.)

Attack in BritilJh waters.-The British Govermnent protested to General Francisco Franco today against the violation of British territorial waters by Insurgent vessels in
their action against the Loyalist destroyer Jose Luis Diez on
Dec. 30. Britain reserves the right to claim compensation
for injuries to four British subjects injured by shell splinters and damaged property.
The holding of the destroyer by British authorities at
Gibraltar is described here as unusual, although not irregular. The ship is not interned but her crew, having failed
to remove her from British territorial waters within the
period for which she received permission to stay, has been
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repatriated. The ship remains i1nmobilized although presumably she 'vould be immediately handed over if the Spanish Government asked for her and arranged to remove her
without violation of territorial waters. Such a possibility,
however, seems remote at present. (New York Times,
January 12, 1939.)

The Wisconsin.-The American freighter Wisconsin,
under command of Captain Hiram Taft, left Barcelona
today for an undisclosed port, so it is no'v permissible to
tell you how an armed Rebel trawler fired four shots at her
off Gibraltar and tried to capture her.
Captain Taft, who is a Yankee, has been carrying on a
dangerous Spanish trade all the year through bombings,
Piutinies and other 'dangers. He refused to halt when
attacked and pushed straight ahead, for his ship's American
flag was flying and he carried a legal cargo of lentils, rice
and other food.
It was a case of fortune favoring the brave, for the Rebel
trawler developed engine trouble just at the crucial moment
and had to abandon the chase. She signaled ahead to a
Rebel cruiser, which, however, did not molest the Wisconsin.
Captain Taft made a full report to the United States
Consul at Barcelona, who in turn forwarded the information
to the State Department.
As Captain Taft told the 'vriter the story in the relative
safety of a Barcelona hotel this is what happened:
FRENCH VESSEL ATTACKED

Eighty miles west of Gibraltar the 1Visconsin heard an
S 0 S from a French ship en route to Brest, France, from
Oran, Algeria, and in later messages learned that the French
ship had been fired on, stopped and boarded by Spanish
Rebels, who had started to take her to Ceuta, Spanish
Morocco, when a French cruiser came to her aid.
The Rebels then gave up their prey, but Captain Taft was
heading for the same spot and foresaw trouble. He radioed
to Gibraltar, asking if an American destroyer or cruiser
were there, but received a negative reply. This was in the
evening on Nov. 16.
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At 1 A. ~1. the next day the radio officer informed Captain
Taft that another French vessel had been captured and
apparently had not been rescued.
About 5 o'clock the same morning, the captain continued,
"'vhen about five and one-half miles south southeast of
Gibraltar, an armed trawler proceeded alongside, sweeping
the 1Visconsin with a searchlight. At that time the American flag was flying from the flagstaff and huge American
flags were painted on the vessel's sides. The tra,vler kept
the searchlight on the flagstaff about two 1ninutes and the
flag ''as open to windward.
HALTS IN 1\IIDST OF ATTACK

"The trawler proceeded ahead of the W iscon.s·i n, fired a
shot across the bow and ordered me to halt, which I refused
to do. Then another shot was fired and this time it was not
a blank for shrapnel whistled over me and the chief officer.
Two more shots " .. ere fired, after which the trawler stopped,
evidently because of engine trouble, but it 1rept flashing its
searchlight in the air and then at the Wisconsin.
"About ten minutes later we were swept by t'vo searchlights from a Spanish Rebel cruiser which was lying to the
east of the Strait. She kept one searchlight on the American flag about a minute but did not hail and I proceeded
out of the Strait of Gibraltar.''
This was a typical incident of the Spanish trade. It is a
hard, dangerous game but it has its rewards in money and
excitement and, in Captain Taft's case, moral satisfaction
for the wheat, beans, rice and n1edical supplies he has
brought to Loyalist Spain ·on repeated trips are desperately
needed. (New York Times, December 4, 1938.)
1

1 he Palos.-That the Fascist Bloc did not confer belligerent status upon the Spaniards by their (recognition)
of the 19th of Noven1ber, 1936 "\Vas clearly manifested by
the German treatinent of the Loyalist seizure of the steamer
Palos, Decen1ber 24, supposedly en route from Hamburg to
\Tigo, the German ship 'vas picked up by Basques in * * *
the Bay of Biscay and taken in with 1,500 tons of "prohibited freight" and t'vo Spanish insurgent agents on board.
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The Ger1nan Gover1unent, in demanding the release of the
ship, alleged ''the Palos was seized far outside the territorial waters of the Spanish coast, namely 23 miles northeast of Cape ~1achichaco. The captain of the Palos refused
to sign a protocol according to which the Palos supposedly
'vas seized five miles off the coast, although this alleged location of seizure also lies outside the three mile limit and
therefore outside the sovereign territory of Spain." The
Basques denied that the arrest took place outside of their
jurisdiction, but refused to specify exactly 'vhere it did
occur.
If the incident occurred where the Germans charged it
did, it must be said that the vessel was in a strange location
for a course Ha1nburg-Vi go. If the ship was seized five
miles from the coast, the Spaniards might maintain that
under their historic interpretation of the principle of jurisdiction in marginal waters-that is to say, out to six miles
from the coast-they were acting correctly in seizing the
German boat.
If freedom of passage through marginal waters were demanded by Germany, it must be admitted that, while many
believe there is a right of free passage in time of peace, the
law is not entirely certain in this regard, and especially in
time of quasi-peace such as prevails in Spain at the 1non1ent.
'Vhatever may have been the locus of the seizure of the
Palos~ and regardless of whatever merits there may have
been in the seizure by the Spaniards in the first instance,
Ger1nany de1nanded the release of the vessel, her cargo, and
the Spanish subjects on board. Failing to secure the release of the contraband and the Spanish rebel passengers, the
German cruiser Koenigsburg seized the 1,500-ton Spanish
steamer L-lrgonne. on January 1, attempted to seize the
ste~uner Soton January 2, and seized the steamer lJfarta Jttnquera January 4. The government communique justified the
action in these words :
"After the Red Rulers in Bilbao refused to surrender to
the German cruiser K oenigsburg the passengers and part of
the cargo retained from the steamer Pal()s, the German
Government, as previously announced, saw itself compelled
to enforce its den1ands through counter measures. In pursuit of this necessity to defend German sovereign rights
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against an act of piracy a Red Spanish steamer has been
seized provisionally by the Gern1an naval forces in Spanish
waters."
The loyalists were warned that if their demands were
not met by January 8, "the Spanish steamers and their cargoes will be utilized by the Ger1nan Government in their
account with the Spanish Governn1ent recognized by it. In
case of repetition of acts of piracy against German n1erchant
vessels, the German Government will be compelled to take
further Ineasures." The vessels 'vere turned over to the
rebels on the failure of the Basques to hand over the goods
and passengers.
The tenor of the German ulti1nata and the reprisals taken
indicate clearly that the Reich did not recognize that the
Spaniards possessed belligerent rights. Not enjoying such
rights respecting German vessels on the high seas, the Gern1ans were quite within bonds in their demands and, failing
to secure them, in taking such reprisals as seemed a quid pro
quo for the tort committed. (N. J. Padelford, "International Law and the Spanish Civil War," American Journal
of International Law, April, 1937, pp. 237-239.)

British policy in regard to attacks.-The British Governtnent has made it abundantly clear that it does not regard the
existence of civil war in Spain as conferring license upon any
Spanish forces to interfere with British shipping on the high
seas, and that it will not tolerate even such interference as
the visiting of British ships in order to establish their character. Still less, of course, does it tolerate any more violent
interference, and the British Navy has orders to afford protection to all British shipping against attack upon unarmed
1nerchantmen provided they are its o'vn. It has persistently
advanced the principle that internationalla'v no less than the
dictates of humanity and civilization forbids such attacks
even in time of war * * *
It is no justification of these crimes to plead that neither
Spanish Governn1ent has acceded to the Proces-Verbal
adopted by the rest of the ""oriel; or that since they are not
accorded the belligerent right of visit and search of merchant
ships at sea, kno,ving that their enemies' ships are using false
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colors, they have no alternative but to attack at sight. A new
government seeking recognition does not recommend itself to
the 'vorld by flouting the principles adopted by the world,
even on the plea tl~at its rival has not formally adopted them;
and even the accordance of belligerent rights would not carry
license to subject the ships even of the rival Governn1ent in
its ow·n country to the treatment inflicted of late upon all and
sundry * , * *. (London Times, August 18, 1937.)

The observation sche1ne a1~d visit and search.In part (a) of Situation III the cruiser Fona of
state F is functioning in a double capacity: it is
a patrol ship unde~ the Observation scheme and it
is a national "\varship which has the duty to protect
the commerce of state F. ·T hough the Ferart is violating both the Non-Intervention scheme and the
domestic law of st~te F, since it is carrying aircraft
to state B, the Cape, the cru~ser of the Commoners,
possesses no rights of visit and search. Enforcement of the domestic legislation and of the special
schen1e by which the Feran is bound, is not the
function of an insurgent warship whose actions
must be controlled entirely by international law.
As pointed out above, ins'u rgent craft have none of
the rights of belligerents at sea and any interference with the Feran is illegal. It is for the Fona
to warn the master of the Feran that the latter is
infringing upon the special rules, and it is the duty
of the Fo1La to protect the Fera1~ from any internationally illegal molestation. A cruiser of the government B since it is a "\Varship of a recognized
power, would have the right to approach the Fera1~
(The Marianna Flora, 11 vVheaton, 1) but it would
have no authority to visit and search, so that its
rights would not differ greatly from those of the
Gape.
f
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I11 part (c) the Gyra is violating no law, either
domestic or international, and ·is engaged upon a
perfectly lawful voyage. Oil is not a commodity
'vhich con1es under the heading of ''Arms, Ammunition and In1plements of War'' and thus was not
prohibited by the Non-Intervention plan or by the
domestic law of state G. The carrying of arms by
the Gyra for the preservation of discipline was lawful. (See Sec. 10 of the American law above.)
Lil{e the Cape in part (a) the Bai1~ had no right to
sun1mon the Gyra to come to for visit and search.
It is incumbent on the Ge1Lo, the cruiser of state G,
to come to the Gyra's assistance and to drive off
the Bai1~ by force if necessary. The Ge1~o would
have no right, if it arrives too late to save the Gyra,
to make a counter-attack upon the Bai1~, either
under general international law or the special
Geneva Arrangement. Warships summoned to aid
merchant vessels are limited to the use of force for
"preventive" purposes, not for punitive. Force
"can never be exercised with a view to inflicting
punishment. Retaliation for acts already committed is not allowable.'' (United States Navy Regulations, Art. 723.) . Where submarines were concerned, the Nyon accord permitted counter-attacks
for purposes immediately punitive but ultimately
preventive. Under the .Geneva accord the cruiser
of state H, if it actually witnessed the attacl\: by
the Bai1~, could intervene to protect the merchant
vessel to the best of its ability.
Resistance to illegal visit and search.-Even if
there had been belligerency the Bain would have
had no right to sink the Gyra merely because the
latter resisted visit and search. If a summoned
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vessel resists or takes to flight it may be pursued
and brought to by forcible means if necessary.
The United States regarded resistance or flight as ground
for using :force sufficient to cause the merchant vessel to lie
to * * * but not a ground :for sinking the vessel. O:f
course the * * * vessel might be sunk in the exercise of
the right, but the use o:f :force was held to be restricted to that
necessary to bring the vessel to, and :forcible resistance by
the merchant vessel was not in itself a ground :for sinking (it)
but a just ground :for its condemnation. (Naval 'Var College
Situations, 1934, p. 50.)
Section 4295 U. S. Revised Statutes: The commander and
cre'v * * * may oppose and defend against any aggression * * * by any armed vessel * * * not being a
public armed vessel o:f some nation in amity with the United
States.

As the action of the Bai.1~ was entirely illegal,
the Gyra had the right to resist, though such action
in the face of overwhelming force may have been
somewhat quixotic. Orders issued by the United
States authorities enjoin resistance to illegal visit
and search, even by a recognized government.
(Naval War College Situation 1912, p. 27.) It is
true that the arms on board the Gyra were there
"for the preservation of discipline" and resistance
to legal visit and seareh would have been unjustifiable, for the Gyra would then be an armed
merchantman. In the light, however, of the practice and orders concerning illegal interference, it
seems reasonable to declare the Gyra's resistance a
legal, though perhaps a foolish, act.
Illegal attacks by subrnarin.e.-In part (b) the
Iris with its cargo of barbed wire was breaking no
domestic or international law. Any possible infraction of the Non-Intervention scheme need not
be considered because state I was not a party to
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that arrangen1ent. The submarine acted illegally
whether it encountered the Iris inside or ot1tside
the 3-mile limit. Within territorial \Vaters a submarine, disclosi11g its iaentity, would have the right
to stop the Iris and to direct it but in no circumstances to destroy it. Outside the 3-Inile limit a
properly marked sub1narine of state B might approach the Iris but it could not visit and search.it
.o r order its destruction. Visit and search by the
~established government or b~y the rebels during
insurge11cy is illegal. (Naval War College Sit-uation, 1912, pp. 21-24; 2 Moore, "International
.Arbitrations,'' pp. 1021.)
Even if the situation had been one of belligerency, the I r£s could not legally have been ordered
about i11 this fashion. The submarine should have
shown its flag and should have visited and searched
the Iris before ordering destruction. According
to the London rules of 1930 there could be no
destruction of the merchant ship, even if the lives
of those on board were saved, unless the ship had
been captured, and the1~ it could have been destroyed only if taking it into a port wot1ld have
involved danger to the submarine and if the ship's
papers had been placed in safety. (See also Arts.
49 and 50 of the Declaration of London, 1909.)
Thus on every cot1nt the sub1narine \Vas guilty of
unlawful action. The Nyon arra11gement \Vas designed to meet just such a situation as this, and
though the ship's person11el \Vas given a chance
for safety, the submarine was attacking "in a man11er contrary to the rules of i11ternational law
referred to'' in the London Treaty of 1930 and the
Protocol of 1936. Whereas normally the I ona
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would have the right to employ only preventive
force to protect the Iris) as a warship of a state
signatory to the Nyon treaty it may use force beyond that which is actllally needed to save the !Tis
and may counter-attacl{ the submarine. This was
the special grant of authority in the Nyon convention which vvas drafted with a vie\v to halting
attacl{s made in an illegal manner, attacks performed by legal methods being left subject to the
general rules which pern1it preve11tive force by the
protecting warship of a merchant vessel's own
state. The cruiser of State H like\vise should intervene to attack the submarine. A submarine of
the Commoners or of state D acting in similar
illegal fashion would be subject to the sa1ne drastic
treatment.
What const~·tutes an ((attack. JJ_N o actual firing
of a projectile or sinking of a ship has to take place
for an act or a series of acts to constitute an "attack." In this instance it is not necessary to
vvait until the torpedo is launched before the submarine can be considered to l1ave attacked the Irrt·s.
The \vord ''attack'' covers 111ore than the mere employment of force. To reascm otherwise would
be to go counter to a11 the dictates of law and common se11see A threat can be an attack just as vvell
as the carrying out of that threat, and the notice
to the I rris in this case 1nay be likened to an ''assault" in domestic law.
It is not essential in order to constitute a wrong that the
'vrongdoer shall have fully carried out his intention nor that
any actual damage shall result * * * (he is) liable if
his conduct 'vas such as reasonably created in the plaintive
the belief that such ability and intent existed. (A. B. Hall,
"Elementary Law Manual," p. 52.)'
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Resurne.-lt1 times of civil strife when there is
no recognition of belligerency, the merchant ships
of third states are not subject to visit and search
on tl1e high seas and it is tl1e duty of war vessels
of those states to protect their nations' merchant
shipping from interference. Within territorial
waters a parent state, in cases of insurgency, may
close a port provided it does so "effectively," and
the rebels too "\vithin the 3-mile limit may prevent
supplies from reaching their domestic adversaries.
These are the rules for the usual instances of insurgency. In particular cases, like that of Spain
recently, and that of state B in Situation III, foreign po,vers may adopt special n1easures like those
of Non-Intervention, the American legislation on
civil strife, and the Nyon and Geneva arrangements. Such actions, however, are based not upon
international law, but upon consideration of politics and expediency at the moment. In this situation, therefore, the cruisers F onaJ I onaJ and Geno
are obligated to employ force against the cruisers
and submarines which are making unwarranted
attacks upon innocent (at least insofar as international law is concerned) merchant ships. Special
rights attach to the cruisers of I and H under the
Geneva and Nyon Conventions, and the cruisers
of F and G, in addition to protecting ships of their
fellow nationals, have special duties under the NonIntervention scheme of Observation. The rules
of the usual law and the stipulations of these new
and uniq~e conventions comb]ne to form the basis
for the solution.
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SOLUTION

(a) The Fona should notify the Feran that it
is corning to its aid to protect it against an illegal
act. The Fona also should notify the Gape that
the latter has no right to interfere with the Feran
and should threaten the use of force against the
Gape if it refuses to desist. The rights would be
the same if the summons had been by a cruiser of
state 13.
·
(b) The I on a should notify the Iris to try to
escape and should notify the submarine that it has
no rights in this situation and that force will be
used against it for the protection of the Iris. If
the I ona arrives before the Iris is actually attacked
it should drive off the submarine by force, and if
it reaches the place of attack too late to save the
Iris, it should counter-attack the submarine. The
rights would be the same if the submarine had been
under the flag of the _Commoners or that of state D.
(c) The Geno should notify the Gyra to cease
its resistance and should notify the Bain that the
latter has no right either to visit and search or to
sink the Gyra and should threaten force to compel
it to desist. The rights would be the same if the
summons was by a cruiser of the Commoners.
The cruiser of state H should take no action in
the case of the Feran. In the case of the Iris, it
may intervene and may counter-attack and destroy the submarine. In the case of the Gyra, if
it witnessed the attack, it may intervene to protect
the Gyra but has no authority to counter-attack
or destroy the Bain.

